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Many observers argue that the abnormal accumulation of risk by banks has been one of the major causes 
of the 2007-2009 financial turmoil. But what could have pushed banks to engage in such a risk race? The 
answer brought by this paper builds on the classical signaling model by Spence. If banks’ returns can be 
observed while risk cannot, less efficient banks can hide their type by taking more risks and paying the 
same returns as the efficient banks. The latter can signal themselves by taking even higher risks and 
delivering bigger returns. The game presents several equilibria that are all characterized by excessive risk 
taking as compared to the perfect information case. 
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Abstract
Many observers argue that one of the major causes of the 2007-2009 nancial turmoil was the abnormal
accumulation of risk by banks. In this paper, we provide an explanation for this "risk race" that builds on
the classical signaling approach. If banks returns can be observed while risk cannot, less e¢cient banks
can hide their type by taking more risks and paying the same returns as the e¢cient banks. The latter
can signal themselves by taking even higher risks and delivering bigger returns. The game presents several
equilibria that are all characterized by excessive risk taking as compared to the perfect information case.
Keywords: Banking sector, Risk strategy, Risk/return tradeo¤, Signaling, Imperfect information.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 crisis has been by all dimensions one of the most severe since the Great Depression
(Brunnermeier, 2009). Social costs were huge, both in terms of output loss and rising unemploy-
ment. Fiscal positions of many countries were deeply undermined, with lasting consequences on
growth prospects. While scholars will debate for many years about the contribution of di¤erent
factors to this crisis, there is one point on which a majority of experts tend to agree: the nancial
di¢culties that were at the origin of the crisis were brought about mainly by an abnormal accu-
mulation of risk by banks (Borio, 2008; Trichet, 2008; Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Stiglitz, 2010).
This observation begs the question on why, in the rst place, did banks engage in what can be
described as a genuine race for risk?
One key feature of banking activity is their opacity in functioning and management. As
emphasized by Morgan (2002, p.874) "risks taken into the process of intermediation are hard to
observe from outside the banks". Indeed, banks are traditionally very reluctant to disclose any
information about their clients on both sides of their balance sheets. Furthermore, the composition
of their asset portfolio is both a strategic decision and a key factor of success; no bank will
eagerly disclose this information. Over the last twenty years, the complexity (and the opacity) of
banks nancial intermediation increased dramatically, being driven essentially by a shift from the
traditional "deposit and loan" model to the "orginate-to-securitize" model (Diamond and Rajan,
2009; Stiglitz, 2010). In theory, securitization should have allowed banks to transfer most of the
credit risk to a myriad of investors; in practice, recent data show that US banks used to hold
large amounts of high risk securities on their books; furthermore, during the crisis, they had to
cover the risks carried by o¤-balance sheet entities they had created for securitization purposes.
European banks have also aggressively invested in CDOs with a hidden content in US subprime
loans, that had a true risk known only to a minority of insiders. Hence, while bank returns are
disclosed every quarter, the structural risk taken by a bank is much harder to assess.
In general, given that higher risks command higher returns, banking technology allows the
manager to choose the preferred risk/return combination. As the experience of this crisis has
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shown, banks are not equally equipped to face adversity. The list of "losers" is as long as the
list of "winners".1 Actually, banks di¤er in their portfolio of activities, investment and loan
opportunities, risk management systems and operating costs. In this paper we focus on the latter,
and assume that there are only two types of banks, the highly e¢cient (or good) ones and the
less e¢cient (or bad) ones. A less e¢cient bank can deliver the same returns as an e¢cient bank
only if it takes more risks on its balance sheet. We then analyze banks risk/return strategies
within the framework of a classical signaling game (Spence, 1973, 2002; Riley, 1975) that opposes
banks managers to shareholders. In a perfect information world, all investors would ee the less
e¢cient banks to join the most e¢cient ones, and the former type of bank would be pulled out
of the market. However, if returns can be observed by private investors but risk cannot, then less
e¢cient banks would survive if they manage to conceal their type. They can do so by increasing
the amount of risk in order to deliver the same returns as the high e¢cient banks. In equilibrium,
bad banks take too much risks.
Another set of equilibria can be obtained if the regulator can set an upper limit on the amount
of risk that banks can take, without challenging the assumption of imperfect information. As
the experience of this crisis has shown, regulators can get information about the true exposure
to dubious assets by performing time-consuming stress tests that measure a banks resilience to
simulated additional shocks. In the US, the Treasury made public the methodology and results of
these tests for each large bank subject to these checks; European regulators decided to keep the
bank-specic information secret.2 Hence the regulators information is private knowledge, and
the public cannot use it in order to make his investment decisions. Some prudential ratios might
also be communicated only to the regulator, without being publicly disclosed. If such an upper
bound on risk exists, and this limit is known by banks only (and the regulator), good banks can
signal themselves by increasing returns (and risk) up to the point where bad banks cannot follow
them. If not all good banks undertake the costly "super-signaling" strategy, then bad banks can
1 The dramatic fall of Lehman Borhers, or the massive support of the respective governements to rescue Citi-
group, UBS, Dexia or Northern Rock, etc. should be weighted against rather successful stories of Barclays, Nomura,
Santander, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, and so on.
2 See for instance: "US to push Europe on stress tests", WSJ (02.06.2010), about the conict between the US
Treasury and the European Commission on publicly disclosing results of the tests in Europe.
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further survive by taking excessive amounts of risk.
We show that such a game presents several types of equilibria, depending on the on the
proportion of good banks and operating costs. The main contribution of the paper is to emphasize
that, under imperfect information, in any of these equilibria at least some banks have no other
optimal choice than to hold on their balance sheet more risk than in a perfect information set-up.
Furthermore, for some parameter values, we get a typical conguration of multiple equilibria;
which one of them actually materializes ultimately depends on investors beliefs. In a multiple
equilibria setting, the economic system is prone to extreme instability.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our main assumptions, Section
3 analyzes the equilibria of the game, Section 4 presents our conclusions.
2 Main assumptions
The model is cast as a game between banks managers and shareholders under imperfect infor-
mation of the latter about the structure of the asset portfolio of the bank. The banking sector is
made up of publicly listed banks, that take deposits and issue debt in order to grant loans and
buy nancial assets. If the bank has access to a risk-free asset and to a portfolio of risky assets
and loans, the manager can pick any combination of risk/return along the capital market line, a
tangent to the e¢cient frontier (Markowitz, 1952). A higher return can be obtained only if the
bank takes more risks (by investing more in the e¢cient portfolio of risky assets and loans).
Denoting the net return by R and the amount of risk by v; this typical trade-o¤ between risk
and return for a bank of type i can be written:
Ri(v) = R0 + v   c
i; (1)
where R0 > 0 is the interest rate of the risk-free asset,  > 0 is the slope of the capital market
line and ci stands for the bank-specic operating cost.3 The inverse function, indicating the risk
needed to achieve a given return for a bank with operating cost ci is also of interest for further
3 Financial literature focuses on return variance (denoted often by 2) as a proxy for risk. The risk considered
in this text is of the nature of an extreme event. The impact of such event on the rm cannot be directly inferred
from the observed return variance.
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developments:
vi(R) =  1

R R0 + c
i

: (2)
We assume that, depending on the quality of their management, banks di¤er in their operating
costs.4 To keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that banks can be of two types:
good banks (of type g) with a low operating cost cg that can be normalized to zero without loss
of generality and bad banks (of type b) with a high operating cost cb = c > 0: In Figure 1, we
represent the capital market lines of such a good and bad bank. It can be noticed that in order to
provide shareholders the same net return, bad banks must take riskier bets, that is vb(R) > vg(R);
8R > R0.
Let q be the proportion of good banks in the total population of banks, 1   q being the
proportion of bad banks. This distribution of banks is common knowledge.
In a general form, we represent the utility of the representative risk-averse shareholders by a
quasiconcave function U(R; v); with @U(; )=@R > 0; @U(; )=@v < 0. Resulting indi¤erence curves
are convex.
Shareholders agree to pay the banks manager a compensation that is proportional to their per-
ceived utility, or W = E[U(R; v)]; where E[ ] is the expectations operator;5 the compensation
factor  is not essential, so we normalize it to 1.
Under these assumptions, in a perfect information set-up, a manager running a good bank
would simply choose the bundle (RH ; vH) that maximizes his income given the banks capital
market line, such as indicated at point A in Figure 1.
Notice that the manager of a bad bank would prefer the bundle (RL; vL); at point B in the
same gure. Yet, given that shareholders satisfaction is higher for good banks than for bad banks,
no investor would hold the bad bank stocks: therefore less e¢cient banks cannot survive in this
perfect information world.
However, the assumption of perfect information is not very realistic given that a banks risk
4 The structure of the problem and the solution would not change if, instead of di¤erent operating costs, we
assume that banks di¤er in their investment opportunities (thus, the Markovitz frontier would be broader for the
stronger bank, and the slope of its capital market line would be steeper than for the weaker bank).
5 These expectations will be determined over the set of beliefs about the type of bank given the return strategy.
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Figure 1: Return strategies, risk and utilities
exposure is a very complex commodity. As noticed in the Introduction, it is very di¢cult for
outsiders, even for expert ones, to evaluate the full amount of risk taken by a bank. Building
on these basic fact, we further assume that the level of risk exposure of a given bank is private
information to its manager, while the stock return is public information. In this context the set
of strategies of the banks is more sophisticated:
 For bad banks, like in the perfect information set-up, the strategy of playing RL is never
optimal since it reveals the type of the bank and all the shareholders would leave it. At
di¤erence with the perfect information case, in the imperfect information environment a bad
bank can survive if it manages to conceal its type. It can reach this outcome by increasing
the riskiness of its portfolio such as to deliver the return RH ; i.e. the perfect information
return of the good bank (at point B in Figure 1).
 Good banks can play their perfect information optimal strategy RH as well. However, if
good banks want to make sure that no bad bank has an incentive to imitate them, they
should pay a su¢ciently high return that a bad bank cannot deliver it. In order to analyze
the broadest set of equilibria, let us assume that regulators can set an upper limit on the
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total risk allowed to be taken by any bank, denoted by v (the vertical line on Figure 1).
Shareholders no not have the same ability to measure risk as the regulator. This situation
is characteristic for instance of the European banking landscape where results to stress tests
carries out in 2009 were not made public. Then, for sure, if a bank pays a return slightly
above RS , dened by:
RS = R0 + v   c; (3)
then it signals itself as a good bank, given that bad banks cannot further increase risk such
as to copy them.6 RS is thus the second return strategy of the good bank.
Turning now to the managers payo¤, we argued that if investors perceive that a bank is of the
bad type, this bank leaves the market and the compensation of the manager becomes zero. So,
a positive compensation for the manager can be dened only for banks that stay on the market
(those that are not been perceived as being bad banks). Denoting by Pr[ijRj ] the probability
shareholders assign to the event that a bank is of the type i; with i 2 fb; gg; if the return strategy
is Rj , with j 2 fL;H; Sg, the managers payo¤ can be written:
W (Rj) =
8>><
>>:
0; if Pr[bjRj ] = 1
Pr[gjRj ]U(Rj ; vg(Rj)) + Pr[bjRj ]U(Rj ; vb(Rj)); if Pr[bjRj ] 2 [0; 1[
(4)
Notice that return strategiesRS andRL reveal perfectly a banks type. ThusW (RS) = U(RS ; vg(RS))
and W (RL) = 0.
Figure 2 presents the decision tree.
The typical sequence of decisions goes like this:
 At step 0, Nature picks the type of bank, either b or g:
 At step 1, depending on their type, banks chose their return strategy.
 At step 2, shareholders make their opinion about the type of bank given the observed returns
and pay the manager a compensation proportional to their own expected utility; the game
ends.
6 In principle, the government policy is common knowledge, thus shareholders should know what is this upper
limit. However, this is not a necessary assumption in our model. What is important, is that banks know the upper
risk limit.
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RS
RH
RH
q
1­q
Type g
Type b
α
1­α
RL
W(RS)=U(RS,v(RS))
W(RL)=0
W(RH)=E[U(RH,vi(RH))]
Manager’s payoff
Figure 2: Decision Tree
Finally, we notice that the gap between U(RS ; vg(RS)) and U(RH ; vb(RH)) depends on the op-
erating cost c: Figure 3 shows that there is a critical ~c such that U(RS ; vg(RS)) = U(RH ; vb(RH)):
Taking RH as given and using Eq. (2), we can show that the utility of the manipulating bad
bank is decreasing in c:
dU(RH ; vb(RH ; c))
dc
=
@U(RH ; vb(RH ; c))
@vb(RH ; c)
dvb(RH ; c)
dc
=  1Uv < 0: (5)
On the other hand, using Eq (3) to determine dRS=dc =  1 and Eq. (2), to get dvg(RS)=dRS =
 1 we can show that the utility of the good bank that implements the signaling strategy is
increasing in c :
dU(RS(c); vg(RS(c)))
dc
=
@U()
@RS

dRS
dc

+
@U()
@vg
dvg(RS(c))
dRS(c)

dRS
dc

=
=  UR   Uv
 1 =   1UR[  MRS(R
S ; v(RS))]: (6)
But outside the optimum of the good bank, for RS > RH ; the marginal rate of substitution
MRS =  Uv=UR > ; thus the derivative has a positive sign.
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Figure 3: The critical operating cost ~c
Thus, for any c < ~c we have U(RS ; vg(RS)) < U(RH ; vb(RH)) and for c > ~c; U(RS ; vg(RS(c))) >
U(RH ; vb(RH ; c)). This is the case depicted in Figure 1.
3 Equilibria
An equilibrium of this game is dened as a situation where banks strategies are optimal (i.e., allow
to their CEO to earn the highest compensation) given shareholders beliefs about the type of bank,
and shareholders beliefs are correct given banks optimal strategies. We may distinguish between
a separating equilibrium (where the return strategy of the banks perfectly reveals their type), a
pooling equilibrium (where all banks implement the same strategy and thus no information about
the type of bank can be inferred from the observed return strategy), and a hybrid equilibrium
(wherein banks play Nash mixed strategies and their strategy carry some but not full information
about their type).
In order to rule out a trivial situation, we admit that, by increasing risk enough, bad banks
can deliver the perfect information optimal return of the good bank, or, in an equivalent way, that
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RS > RH :7 If bad banks cannot copy the strategy of the good banks, only the latter do survive
and implement the perfect information strategy RH :
3.1 Signaling equilibrium: good banks do RS
We can show that an elementary separating equilibrium where all good banks deliver their signaling
return RS and bad banks have left the market is always possible.
In such an equilibrium, good banks strategy is s(g) = RS : The equilibrium beliefs are:
Pr[gjRS ] = 1; and, given that any bank that pays less than RS should be a bad bank, Pr[gjRL] = 0
and Pr[gjRH ] = 0:
Bad banks can play either RL or RH ; but given the system of beliefs, the managers payo¤ is:
W
 
RL

=W
 
RH

= 0. There is no incentive for a bad bank to stay in the market. Furthermore,
RS is the optimal strategy for the good bank: indeed, the condition W
 
RS

> W
 
RH

= 0 is
always true.
In this equilibrium, the risk exposure of good banks exceeds the perfect information level,
vg(RS) > vg(RH): Good banks resort to excessive risk taking as a barrier to entry.
3.2 Pooling equilibrium: all banks do RH
We can now put forward the existence of a pooling equilibrium where all banks play RH : bad
banks play the perfect information optimal strategy of good banks, and good banks decide not to
signal themselves by doing RS : Banks single strategy is s(i) = RH ; 8i 2 fb; gg:
Shareholders equilibrium beliefs can be written: Pr[gjRS ] = 1; Pr[gjRH ] = q and Pr[gjRL] = 0:
Necessary conditions for this equilibrium are: (1) W (RH) > W (RS) for the good bank and
(2) W (RH) > W (RL) = 0 for the bad bank. Since W (RS) > 0; the equilibrium exists under
the single condition W (RH) > W (RS): Given the denition of the managers payo¤ (Eq. 4), this
condition becomes:
qU(RH ; vg(RH)) + (1  q)U(RH ; vb(RH)) > U(RS ; vg(RS)) (7)
7 In turn, this condition is met only if the operating cost is not too big, i.e. if c < R0 + v  RH :
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or:
q > q1 
U(RS ; vg(RS))  U(RH ; vb(RH))
U(RH ; vg(RH))  U(RH ; vb(RH))
: (8)
In the small operating cost case (c < ~c), we have U(RS ; vg(RS)) < U(RH ; vb(RH)) that implies
q1 < 0: the previous condition is always true. The pooling equilibrium always exists if the loss of
utility of shareholders who support a bad bank is not too large; this can happen if the operating
cost gap c is small.
In the large operating cost case (c > ~c), we have U(RS ; vg(RS)) > U(RH ; vb(RH)); thus q1 > 0:
Furthermore, q1 < 1 as U(R
S ; vg(RS)) < U(RH ; vg(RH)): We can conclude that in the large cost
case, the pooling equilibrium exists only if the frequency of good banks is large enough. If there
are not too many bad banks who imitate the good banks, the manager of the latter has not too
much to lose, and it does not worth for him to implement an expensive signaling strategy.
In the pooling equilibrium, bad banks take too much risks as compared to the perfect infor-
mation set-up, but they all survive in this environment.
3.3 Hybrid equilibrium: some good banks signal themselves, all others
play RH
In this equilibrium, a proportion  of the good banks decide to signal themselves by playing RS ;
and (1   ) play their perfect information strategy RH . All bad banks copy the latter and play
RH :
The mixed equilibrium strategy of the good banks is s(g) = fRS + (1   )RH j 2 [0; 1]g
and the bad banks strategy is s(b) = RH : Using Bayes rule, and denoting by Pr[Rj ji] the prob-
ability that a bank of type i plays strategy Rj , equilibrium beliefs can be written: Pr[gjRL] = 0;
Pr[gjRS ] = 1 and:
Pr[gjRH ] =
Pr[RH jg] Pr[g]
Pr[RH ]
=
(1  )q
(1  )q + (1  q)
: (9)
In equilibrium, a good bank must be indi¤erent between strategies RH and RS :
W (RS) =W (RH), U(RS ; vg(RS)) = Pr[gjRH ]U
 
RH ; vg(RH)

+ Pr[bjRH ]U
 
RH ; vb(RH)

:
(10)
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This equation allows us to determine (1  ) with respect to predetermined variables:
(1  ) =
(1  q)
q

U(RS ; vg(RS))  U
 
RH ; vb(RH)

[U (RH ; vg(RH))  U(RS ; vg(RS))]
: (11)
We rst notice that U
 
RH ; vg(RH)

  U(RS ; vg(RS)) > 0. Hence, in the small cost case (c < ~c),
since U(RS ; vg(RS)) < U
 
RH ; vb(RH)

we have (1 ) < 0 : the hybrid equilibrium is impossible.
In the large cost case (c > ~c); we have U(RS ; vg(RS)) > U(RH ; vb(RH)); so 1    > 0: The
equilibrium exists if 1   < 1; which is equivalent to:
q > q1 
U(RS ; vg(RS))  U
 
RH ; vb(RH)

U (RH ; vg(RH))  U (RH ; vb(RH))
: (12)
This is the same existence condition as that of the pooling equilibrium in the same large cost case
(Eq 8).
In the hybrid equilibrium, both bad banks and a fraction  of the good banks are taking an
excessive risk. The maximum amount of risk in the economy appears for  ! 1; we infer that if
the hybrid equilibrium is in place, the amount of risk in this economy reaches its highest level for
c& ~c.
3.4 A summary of possible equilibria
Table 1 presents a summary of the possible equilibria. Except for the case of large costs and
a small proportion of bad banks (q < q1), the game features a typical conguration of multiple
equilibria, where the equilibrium that will actually materialize depends on investors beliefs.
"Small" cost (c < ~c) "Large" cost (c > ~c)
"A few" bad banks: q < q1 separating, pooling separating
"Many" bad banks: q > q1 separating, pooling separating, pooling, hybrid
Table 1. Summary of possible equilibria
This analysis was performed using general forms for shareholder utility functions. There is
no need to argue much about the modelling benet of general forms as compared with specic
forms. The reverse side of the coin is that in absence of explicit thresholds (q1 and ~c) it is not
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easy identify what type of equilibrium would describe the best the banking sector situation in the
eve of the last crisis. If we consider the overall number of banks in the US and Europe (more than
8000 in the US and about 7500 in Europe), the proportion of "bad" banks can be seen as being
small. However, if we limit our analysis to the "exclusive" segment of large, multi-product banks
with a global reach, then the proportion of banks that were deeply a¤ected by the crisis turned
out to be substantial. In general, di¤erences between these large banks in terms of investment
opportunities and operating costs are small. Our analysis does not allow to say "how small is
small" as compared to the critical cost ~c (for which we provide only the implicit denition). Thus,
on a pure theoretical ground it is impossible to rule out the hybrid equilibrium case.
In any case, the most important result from our general analysis is that in any equilibrium
except the separating one, banks take too much risks as compared to the perfect information
case. In addition, in all congurations of multiple equilibria, the nancial system is prone to sub-
stantial instability, since shifts from one equilibrium to another are essentially driven by "sandy"
expectations.
4 Conclusion
There is widespread consensus that the origin of the 2007-2009 nancial crisis was an abnormal
accumulation of risk by banks throughout the world. The analysis in this paper connects this race
for risk to imperfect information in the banking sector. In a world where returns can be observed
but risk cannot, banks running with high operating costs would take more risk only to deliver
higher returns and be perceived as highly e¢cient banks. The latter can signal themselves by
further increasing risks well above their perfect information optimal level.
The game presents several equilibria, all being characterized by excessive accumulation of
risk by banks compared to the ideal, perfect information case. Depending on the proportion of
bad banks and the di¤erential in operating costs, the model presents several multiple equilibria
congurations.
The policy implications are straightforward. Any reform able to reduce the asymmetry of
information between banks managers and outsiders should eliminate the key reason for the risk
12
race. Yet there should be no miracle solution able to achieve this result. If banks true exposure
to risk is hard to assess by outsiders and at least some good banks implement their high-risk
signaling strategy, then stronger regulation is needed to cap the maximum amount of risk banks
can take. In the light of this model, the recommendation of the G20 leaders in September 2009
to impose tighter capital requirements on banks and a new leverage limit should go in the right
direction.
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